The Dangers of 'Policy-ising' Social Change

Among those of us who work on public policy and social change, there is a common refrain: “policies shouldn’t be politicised”. What it means, I imagine, is that policies should not be dependent on narrow political interests. Politicisation is a process that is apparent, and relatively easy to detect. However, there is a more subtle and harder-to-discern — but just as troubling — phenomenon within our field: the policy-isation of social change. If the politicisation of policies ties policies to narrow political interests, then the policy-isation of social change confines social change to narrow policy interests.

Although the policy-isation of social change is widely recognised by those of us in the field, it is not something that has been clearly articulated. Below is my feeble attempt to do so, not only as a critical reflection on our uncritical practices in policy making, but also as a way of diagnosing my own tendency toward this phenomenon. Analysing a weakness, after all, does not mean one is free from it!

The anatomy of policy-isation

As a starting point, let’s go over some aspects – behaviours and practices, norms and narratives – that underpin and characterise this phenomenon.

First, policy-isation constructs “achievement” as a primarily document-based process. Achievements are made to be synonymous with the extent to which approaches and solutions (preferably traceable to one’s own recommendations) are successfully inscribed in policy documents. Although the phenomenon is not about document-pushing per se, it focuses on achievements tied to institutional benefits and rewards, over and above the embodiment of these approaches and solutions in practice.

Second, policy-isation promotes a culture of celebrating access to the corridors of power. This flows logically from the first trait, because the more important the policy document, the more power is contained in it. Therefore, “achievement” culminates in accessing these powerful policy platforms. This is not to say, of course, that engagements with the powers that be are not important. But if these engagements are applauded as ends in themselves, then this is a form of policy-isation we should definitely challenge.

Third, policy-isation puts forward a narrative that confers advantage to the policy actors. This story supports the interests of the affected social groups only when they converge with the interests of the policy actors, and disregards other matters that are critical to social change. Frequently these are only accounted for when they fit the strategic positioning of the policy actors, who typically prioritise their or their organisations’ interests.

Fourth, policy-isation uncritically frames the relationship between policy change and social change. Given that policy achievements culminate with the powerful and not the powerless, the links to social change (let alone justice) are often diminished or severed. Some links between policy and social change are taken as given, despite research and reality checks that show them to be tenuous. Articulation of these links is oftentimes done inadequately, or dismissed as someone else’s labour (i.e., leave it to those who work on these things).

Fifth, policy-isation is preoccupied with justifying rather than learning. This comes full circle through the monitoring and evaluation phase of the policy cycle. When the policy change process is disconnected from the social change process, then learning is confined to the policy space and how best to manoeuvre within it. This then leads to an evaluation exercise that is skewed towards justifying the existence of the policy actors and their organisations within the policy space.

Small change: the real harms of policy-isation

The most immediate harm is that the desired social change does not take place; instead, policy change constructed as achievement gives a deceptive appearance of progress. This then becomes the basis for further funding of ineffective approaches and solutions, perpetuating a vicious cycle of policy-making that remains detached from the realities of the social groups that this work purports to represent.

The phenomenon also preserves power within a self-contained policy circuit, without necessarily opening up new spaces of representation. The “powerless” are said to be represented by policy actors, but no attempts (or in rare cases, minimal attempts) are made to create spaces for any non-policy actors to be able to represent themselves.

A focus on the mastery of the tools, language and inclinations of the policy circuit serves to open up opportunities for profit-oriented undertakings, such as overpriced private consulting services. This means that financial flows are retained within this circuit, while the social groups whose needs the policies are meant to address continue to suffer.

The best of intentions, but the narrowest of perspectives

Here, I wish to clarify something: I am not suggesting that this phenomenon is directly caused by the morality, or lack of morality, of policy actors. Rather, I wish to ground my explanations in what I think are the two interlinked factors that produce the conditions necessary for the policy-isation of social change.

The first factor relates to the values and assumptions underpinning much of the funding in the policy world, which emphasise efficiency, tangible results and input-output framing of the social world.

The second factor is the middle class-ification of policy work, fuelled by the surge of bureaucracy in the policy space — writing grants, managing projects, conducting evaluations — which generates the demands for a particular kind of actor, namely a formally educated, professional workforce.

These two factors interact to shape individual actions which are perceived by policy actors themselves as rational and “normal” in their everyday work. After all, funders want their funds to be put to good use, and to galvanise achievements that can be tangibly measured in precise documents. This is far less messy than the realities of the social world that do rarely conform to neat project structures and definable timelines.

On the other hand, it is certainly true that policy professionals have to manoeuvre between funding requirements and their own (typically overly middle-class) conceptions of “good” work and change. So what are we missing? We are sorely lacking meaningful discussions around social change that draw on a rich variety of class perspectives.

Looking beyond: inverting the policy-isation process

I am hesitant to end with an attempt to offer concrete suggestions on what to do, partly because I do not want to give the impression that this phenomenon can be deconstructed in a certain number of steps, proposed by one individual, one who is equally susceptible to the tendencies of policy-isation. As workers in this space, we are not immune to what we criticise.

Instead, I hope this reflection will provoke a broader dialogue among those of us in the field, and also with those outside it, and especially those whom we claim to represent, in order to think more critically about how we can reclaim the place of social change in the policy space. Ultimately, perhaps, our hopes for social change must begin with inverting the phenomenon that has strangled transformative change for far too long.

A version of this article was published on the From Poverty to Power blog, Oxfam.

This article was translated to Malay with the support of AFSEE’s Translation Initiative. Translation by Adriana Nordin Manan.

The views expressed in this post are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Atlantic Fellows for Social and Economic Equity programme, the International Inequalities Institute, or the London School of Economics and Political Science.